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Was ist Gott? Unbekannt, dennoch /  Voll Eigensehaften ist das 
Angesicht /  Des Himmels von i h r n .  ( F r i e d r i c h  H o l d e r l i n ,
“Was Ist Gott?”) 1
H eidegger’s engagem ent with the poctic opus of Fricdrich H olderlin  
began in his s tuden t years and continued  for the rem ainder o f his life.2
1 F ried rich  I Io lderlin , ‘‘Was Ist G ott?” in  Friedrich Holderlin: Selected Poems and Fragments, trans. 
M ichael H am b u rg er (L ondon : P engu in , 1998), 271.
2 In citing  works by H eidegger, I have follow ed re c e n t conven tions by using abbreviations 
fo r volum es o f the  Gesamtausgabe and , w here applicable , abbreviations o f  English translations 
(these are  p a ren th e tica l in the  tex t an d  follow ed by page  n u m b ers): M artin  H eidegger, Ges­
amtausgabe', vol. 4, Erlduterungen zu  Holderlins Dichtung  (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1996)/K e ith  
H oller, trans., Elucidations o f Holderlin s Poetry (A m herst, NY: H um anity, 2000), h e re a lte r  G4? 
vol. 5, Holzwege (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 2003)/Ju lia n  Young an d  K en n e th  H aynes, ed. an d  
trans., O ff the Beaten Track (C am bridge: C am bridge  University Press, 2002), h e re a lte r  G5; vol.
9, Weginarken (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1976)/W illiam  McNeill, ed ., Pathmarks (C am bridge: 
C am bridge University Press, 1998), h e re a lte r  G9; vol. 15, Seminare (F rankfurt: K losterm ann, 
1996), h e re a lte r  G15; vol. 24, Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 
1 9 7 5 )/A lb e rt H olstad ter, trans., The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology (B loom ington : In d ian a  
University Press, 1982), h e rea fte r  G24; vol. 26, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde derLogik im A-usgang 
von Leibniz (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1978 )/M ich ae l H eim , trans., The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic (B loom ington : In d ian a  University Press, 1984), h e re a fte r  G26; vol. 39, Holderlins 
Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein” (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1999), h e rea fte r  G39; vols. 5 6 /  
57, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophic (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1987)/ l e d  Sadler, trans., Towards 
the Definition o f Philosophy (L ondon : A th lone , 2000), h e rea fte r  G 56 /57 ; vol. 60, Phdnomenologie 
des religiosen Lebens (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1995)/M a tth ia s  Fritsch an d  Je n n ife r  A n n a  Go- 
setti-Ferencei, trans., The Phenomenology o f Religious Life (B loom ington : In d ian a  University Press, 
2004), h e re a fte r  G60; vol. 61, Phdnomenologische Interpretationen zu  Aristoteles. E in fuhrung in  die 
phdnomenologische Forschung (F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1985)/R ic h a rd  Rojcewicz, trans., Phe­
nomenological Interpretations o f Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research (B loom ington: 
In d ian a  University Press, 2001), h e rea fte r  G61; vol. 63, Ontologie (Henneneutikk der Faktizitdt) 
(F rankfurt: K losterm ann , 1 9 8 3 )/ J o h n  Van B uren , trans., Ontology: Hermeneutics o f Facticity 
(B loom ing ton : In d ian a  University Press, 1995), h e rea fte r  G63; an d  M artin  H eid eg g er an d  
E lisabeth  B lochm ann , Briejwechsel, 1918-1969 ; ed . Jo a ch im  W. Storck  (M arbach am  N eckar: 
D eutsche Schillergesellschalt, 1989), h e rea fte r  I IB; M artin  H e id eg g er a n d  H ein rich  R ickert, 
Briefe, 1913-1933, ed. A llred  D ink ier (Frankfurt: K losterm ann , 2002); h erea fte r  I IR; J o h n  Van 
B uren , ed ., Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to “Being and Time” and Beyond (Albany: SUNY
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At cach o f the dccisivc tu rn ing  points in his philosophical carccr, H ei­
degger found inspiration in H olderlin .3 M ore rcccntly, com m entators 
have raised questions about the role th a t his reading o f H olderlin  
played in H eidegger’s political actions of the 1930s. It has been sug­
gested tha t H eidegger’s reading o f H olderlin  is linked with a troubling 
nationalism , rom antic militarism, and cult of the G erm an “fa therland .”4 
On this reading, H eidegger’s lectures and essays on H olderlin  from  the 
1930s and  1940s testify to his betrayal o f his youthful work that had 
been anim ated by the m ore congenial spirits of early Christianity and 
Kierkegaard.
W hile I by no m eans wish to deny the troubling aspects o f H eideg­
ger’s rom antic politics, I also want to retrieve an o th er aspect of H ei­
degger’s engagem ent with H olderlin  that has received less attention . 
In particular, I hope to show in what follows tha t H eidegger’s essays 
and  lectures on H olderlin  can be read, in part, as attem pts to work out 
a philosophical theology. This is g rounded  in the claim that philosoph­
ical theology is the “red  th read ” that runs through  all of H eidegger’s 
work, un iting  his early lectures in Freiburg and M arburg with his later 
essays and  lectures on H olderlin  during  the 1930s and beyond. In order 
to substantiate this claim, I will first of all show how H eidegger devel­
oped a tentative philosophical theology during  the early 1920s tha t was 
heavily influenced by his reading o f Luther. T he characteristic positions 
worked ou t during  these early years reappear m uch later, in the 1940s 
and  1950s. Having thus ou tlined  H eidegger’s basic theological position, 
I will go on to exam ine th ree  of his most im portan t discussions o f Hol- 
d e rlin ’s work: (1) the lecture course for w inter sem ester (WS) 1934-35,
(2) the address on the centennial o f H o lderlin ’s death in 1942, and
(3) the postwar essay “Wozu D ichter?” (1946). f will show how, in these
Press, 2002), h e rea fte r  S; M artin  H eidegger, Zollikoner Seminare, Protokelle— Gesprdche— Briefe, 
ed . M edard  Boss (Frankfurt: K losterm ann, 19 8 7 )/F ran z  M eyer an d  R ichard  As key, trans., 
Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters, ed . M edard  Boss (Evanston, IL: N orthw estern  
University Press, 2001), h e rea fte r  ZS. Sim ilar abbrev iations are  used  in  th e  case o f  L u th e r ’s 
works: Luther’s Works, vol. 25, Lectures on Romans: Scholia and Glosses (St. Louis: C oncord ia , 
1974), h e rea fte r  LW25; Luther’s Works, vol. 29, Lectures on Titus, Philemon, Hebrews (St. Louis: 
C oncord ia , 1968), h e re a fte r  LW29; Luther’s Works, vol. 31, The Career o f  the Reformer 1 (Phila­
delph ia : M uh lenberg , 1957), h e rea fte r  LW31.
3 For an  overview o f H e id eg g e r’s re la tionsh ip  with I lo ld e r l in ’s work, see O tto  Pdggeler, 
“H eideggers B egegnung  m it H o ld e rlin ,” M an and World 10 (1977): 13-61. Pdggeler notes 
th a t I le id eg g er was qu ite  fam iliar with poets like I lo ld erlin  an d  Irak i even d u rin g  his s tu d en t 
days, p r io r  to W orld W ar I, an d  that, la te r in life, he  testified to his in terest in H o ld erlin  
d u rin g  th e  1920s (15). T h e  recen t p u b lica tion  o f  H e id eg g e r’s lec tu re  course fo r th e  War 
E m ergency Sem ester o f  1919 testifies to his early  in terest in I lo ld e r l in ’s work (see G 56 /57  
7 4 /6 2 ) .
1 See, e.g., John  Van B uren , The Young Heidegger: Rumor o f the Hidden King  (B loom ington: 
In d ian a  University Press, 1994), 389-90 , 392-93.
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texts, H eidegger continues to articulate his basic theological position 
in in terp re ting  H o lderlin ’s poetry.
I.  H E ID E G G E R  AS P H I L O S O P H I C A L  T H E O L O G IA N
Before proceeding to the explication of H eidegger’s basic theological 
position, three points of clarification are in order. First, and most im­
portant, is the question of whether it is even legitimate to talk about 
H eidegger’s “philosophical theology” in the first place. Legitimate ques­
tions have been raised with regard to giving such a reading of Heideg­
ger.0 For example, Hans Jonas, a student of H eidegger’s during the 
1920s and 1930s, warned theologians that H eidegger’s later thought was 
fundam entally incom patible with Christian theism. Jonas, however, over­
states his case; after all, theologians have fruitfully appropriated Heideg­
ger’s work without thereby having to accept all of his views on particular 
topics. None can deny that H eidegger had a lifelong interest in religion 
and theology, nor can it be gainsaid that there is indeed a “religious 
dim ension” to his philosophy.6 The question is, does H eidegger have 
som ething like a “philosophical theology”?
First of all, the m eaning of the phrase “philosophical theology” 
needs clarification. T here seems to be no obvious, ready-made defini­
tion to which all would agree. Some, for exam ple, m ight hold  that a 
philosophical theology makes no recourse to scriptural tradition . But 
this would seem to exclude many thinkers, including Leibniz and  Kant, 
who make liberal use of the Bible. Thus, to avoid begging any ques­
tions, I will make use of a minimal conception of philosophical the­
ology in what follows. On this conception, philosophical theology is 
the attem pt to explicate the m eaning of religious discourse, to lay bare 
its underlying conceptual structure, and, if need  be, to revise it. To say 
that H eidegger is doing “philosophical theology” is ju s t to say tha t he 
is doing som ething like this.
A fu rth e r issue, however, concerns the use of the phrase “philosoph­
ical theology.” Why n o t use one of the term s native to H eidegger’s 
though t itself, like “phenom enology of religion,” “herm eneutics,” or
° See, e.g., I la n s  Jonas, ‘‘H eid eg g er an d  Theology,” Review o f Metaphysics 18 (1964): 207-33; 
an d  T h e o d o re  Kisiel, ‘‘W ar d e r  friih e  I le id e g g e r ta tsachliche eio ‘ch ristlicher T heo lo g e?’” in 
Philosophic und  Poesie: Otto Poggeler zum 60; Geburstag, ed. A o o em arie  G ethm ann-S iefert (S tu tt­
gart: F rom ann-Ilo lzboog , 1988), 59-75.
6 This te rm  is borrow ed  from  Ilans-G eorg  G ad am er’s classic study, “D ie Religiose D im en­
sion ,” in Gesammelie Werke, vol. 3, Neuere Philosophic: Hegel, llusserl, Heidegger (T ub ingen : Mohr, 
1987), 308-19. See also B e rn h ard  Welte, “G od in H e id eg g e r’s T h o u g h t,” Philosophy l'oday26,
oo. 1 (1982): 85-100.
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“th inking”? First of all, the la tter two designations are m uch too broad, 
in that they encompass H eidegger’s project as a whole. My focus here 
is on a particular, though central, aspect of this overall project. Fur­
therm ore, “phenom enology of relig ion” is also too broad. My in terest 
here is in one part of the phenom enology of religion, th a t is, the con­
cept of God. “Phenom enology of relig ion” em braces m uch m ore than 
this. Perhaps the most serious challenge to the reading of H eidegger 
that 1 am proposing here lies in his own well-docum ented critique of 
“ontotheology,” or with the traditional approach to theistic metaphysics 
in general. As 1 will show in what follows, H eidegger is at pains to 
suggest that one can do philosophical theology w ithout falling into the 
trap of ontotheology.
H eidegger’s early in terest in theology has been extensively docu­
m ented  and  continues to be exam ined by com m entators. This in terest 
continues th ro u g h o u t H eidegger’s time at M arburg (1923-28). At the 
outset of his second Freiburg period, H eidegger could often be found 
in re trea t at the B enedictine m onastery at Beuron (HB 31-32, 40-41). 
O ne com m entator feels quite com fortable in talking about H eidegger’s 
“theology” in the 1930s, particularly in the unpublished  work Beitrdge 
zur Philosophie (1936-38).' His earliest postwar statem ent of his philo­
sophical position, the “L etter on H um anism ,” addresses the concept of 
God quite directly (G9 161/252-53, 169/258). In 1951, H eidegger told 
participants in a sem inar in Switzerland tha t he was still very m uch 
“inclined” to write a “theology” (G15 436). Several years later, he en­
tered  into a relationship with a group of P rotestant theologians. In 
1961, he partic ipated  in a sem inar at Freiburg with no ted  L utheran 
theologian G erhard  Ebeling, who also asked for H eidegger’s assistance 
in editing a later m anuscript by L uther (ZS, Meyer and  Askey transla­
tion, 256). Clearly, then , H eidegger m eets at least a minimal require­
m ent for having a theological position.
The second and th ird  points of clarification concern the nature of 
H eidegger’s philosophical theology. First, H eidegger’s is a philosophical 
theology through and through. By that 1 m ean that his reflections about 
God and about religious life and  history are no t restricted by a prior 
com m itm ent to the dogmatic system of any confession. H eidegger began 
distancing him self from any sort of “official” theology quite early on. 
W riting to Rickert on February 27, 1917, H eidegger tells his adviser that 
“1 have never stood on the narrow Catholic standpoint, i.e., that 1 would
' G u n te r  Figal, “Forgetfu lness o f  G od: C o n c ern in g  the  C e n te r  o f  H eid eg g e r’s Contributions 
to P h ilo s o p h y in  Companion to Heidegger’s ‘‘Contributions to Philosophy, ” ed . C harles E. Scott 
(B loom ington : In d ian a  University Press, 2001), 198-212.
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or had to somehow orient the problems, the conceptions, and the so­
lution to a traditional, extrascientific po in t of view. I will seek for, and 
teach, the tru th  according to a m ore free personal conviction” (HR 42). 
The im port of these remarks for the present discussion is clear enough— 
H eidegger’s philosophical investigations into the concept of God will be 
carried out as far as possible independently  from p rio r com m itm ent to 
a doctrinal system. This is no t to say, of course, that H eidegger com­
pletely detaches him self from Christianity. It is only against the larger 
background of his attem pts to come to grips with the theological and 
philosophical heritage of European culture that H eidegger’s own efforts 
in philosophical theology can be located accurately.
Second, H eidegger’s philosophical theology, like his though t on vir­
tually every o th er subject, was always tentative, provisional, and  elusive. 
Thus, it would be a mistake to expect H eidegger to give a fully worked- 
out philosophical theology after the fashion o f Kant or Hegel. Loose 
notes attached to his WS 1921-22 lecture make it clear tha t H eidegger 
is n o t in terested  in fleshing ou t a full-blown “dogm atics” in any sense, 
bu t ra ther with tentatively and  hesitantly “leading” his readers “in to” 
(ein-leiten) the “basic experience” th a t is and rem ains the core o f reli­
gion (G61 197/148).8 Further, it is no part o f my account here that 
philosophical theology is H eidegger’s exclusive concern. Instead, it is 
merely a p art o f his overall project, albeit one that comes into play at 
the very beginning of his career as a central motive and rem ains op­
erative as a crucial concern th ro u g h o u t the rem ainder of his life.
To sum m arize these clarificatory points: (1) H eidegger’s lifelong in­
terest in theology and religious life certainly qualifies him as a “phil­
osophical theologian”; (2) however, his work in this area does no t re­
spect traditional confessional boundaries; and (3) H eidegger never 
provides a fully worked-out system of philosophical theology, bu t ra ther 
a series of suggestive hints, in triguing historical analyses, and  biting 
criticisms of traditional philosophical theology.
8 In  his no tes fo r a  cance lled  lec tu re  course o n  m edieval mysticism, H eid eg g er articulates 
his p ro je c t thusly: “A p a r t  o f  th e  onto logy o f  relig ion , m ajo r aim: phenom eno logy . O nly a 
ce rta in  rigorously m eth o d ica l do m ain . N o high-flying ph ilosophy  o f  relig ion . We stand  a t the 
beg in n in g , or, m o re  exacdy: we m u st go back  to the  g en u in e  b eg inn ings, an d  the w orld can  
calmly wait, ,4s a  religious person I n e e d  n o  trace o f the  ph ilosophy  o f re lig io n ” (G60 309). A 
re la ted  p o in t is th a t H e id eg g e r’s m o st d e ta iled  discussions o f  ph ilo soph ical theology usually 
involve m o re  negative o r  critical assertions th an  they d o  constructive theorizing . H eid eg g e r’s 
m o st well-known discussions o f  ph ilo soph ical theology are  devo ted  to attack ing  w hat h e  even­
tually ca lled  “on to theo logy ,” th a t is, the  trad itio n  o f  p h ilo soph ical m o n o th e ism  in h e r ite d  from  
the  G reeks. F or an  ex ce llen t discussion o f  this aspect o f  H eid eg g e r’s th o u g h t, see various 
essays in  M ero ld  W estphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Towards a Postmodern Christian Faith (New 
York: F o rd h am  University Press, 2001).
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i i . h e i d e g g e r ’s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h e o l o g y
Having established that H eidegger does indeed have som ething to say 
about philosophical theology, the goal of the present section is to set 
out his basic position in outline. The sheer volume of H eidegger’s dis­
cussions of God and of religious ideas and history is such that I cannot 
hope to provide an exhaustive account here. As is the case with virtually 
all the im portant aspects of his work, H eidegger’s theological reflections 
are closely intertw ined with a host of complex philosophical and per­
sonal issues. Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the basic contours of 
a position that, while first articulated in the years immediately following 
World War I, endures more or less unchanged throughout the rest of 
H eidegger’s life.
The contours o f H eidegger’s theology were decisively shaped by his 
powerful encoun te r with L uther in the early 1920s. O thers have exten­
sively explored the historical details o f H eidegger’s L u ther research.9 
I am m ore in terested  here in the conceptual, philosophical, and  theo­
logical fruits of this research. But, in o rd e r to dem onstrate the depth  
of L u th er’s influence on H eidegger’s own philosophical theology, a 
b rief discussion of L u ther’s though t is in order.
By all accounts, it was L u th er’s early “theology of the cross” tha t most 
decisively influenced Heidegger. It was the “young L uther” whom Hei­
degger explicitly acknowledged as a tu to r in these m atters (G63 5 /4 ) .10 
The “theology of the cross” is L u th er’s designation for any theological 
position, such as his own, tha t repudiates the classic trad ition  of ph il­
osophical m onotheism , which he called the “theology of glory.”11 Lu­
th er worries, first of all, that philosophical m onotheism  actually misses 
the real message of Christianity. As he puts it in the “H eidelberg Dis­
pu ta tio n ” from  1518, “The theologian of glory does no t recognize, 
along with the Apostle, the crucified and h idden  God alone (1 Corin­
thians 2:2)” (LW31 227). More than  that, however, L u ther worries that
9 J o h n  Van B uren  has given th e  m ost extensive d o cu m en ta tio n  o f  this en c o u n te r  betw een 
H eid eg g er and  L uther. See “M artin  H eidegger, M artin  L u th e r,” in Reading Heidegger front the 
Start.: Essays in His Earliest 'Thought, ed. T h e o d o re  Kisiel and  Jo h n  Van B uren  (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1994), 159-74, an d  The Young Heidegger, 146-90, 307-13.
10 W hile it has b e e n  suggested th a t th e  “theo logy  of th e  cross” rem ains in  fo rce  th ro u g h o u t 
L u th e r ’s career, it is nevertheless th e  case th a t th e  term  itself (“theologm crucis”) is used only 
in works fro m  ab o u t 1515 to 1518. For a re c e n t analysis o f L u th e r’s early th o u g h t, see A lister 
E. M cG rath, Luther's Theology o f the Cross: M arlin Luther's Theological Breakthrough (O xford: 
Blackwell, 1985). T h e  classic study, w hich argues fo r th e  p resen ce  o f  th e  “theo logy  o f  the  
cross” even in  L u th e r ’s m o re  m a tu re  th o u g h t, is W alther von L oew enich, Luther's Theology o f  
the Cross, trails. H e rb e r t J . A. B oum an  (M inneapolis: A ugsburg, 1976).
11 By “p h ilo soph ical m o n o th e ism ,” I m ean  th e  trad itio n  stem m ing  fro m  X en o p h an es, Plato, 
and  A ristotle, w here th e  term  “g o d ” (theos) has its place w ithin an  a ttem p t to exp la in  the  
ra tional o rd e r  o f n a tu re  an d  o f  h u m a n  society th ro u g h  theo re tica l reason.
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the “theology o f glory” reflects the same drive for hum an self-aggran­
dizem ent that surfaces in the m ore fam iliar phenom enon  of the “righ­
teousness of works.” M ore specifically, the “theology of glory” is the 
issue of a perverted  desire to determ ine the nature of God indepen­
dently of G od’s own free self-disclosure in the “foolishness” of the 
cross.12 In the end, the “theology of glory” puts itself above God, dic­
tating who and  what God is and  what God can do. L uther writes, “But 
alas, even now very many people th ink in an unworthy way about God 
and claim in bold and  im puden t treatises that God is this way or that 
way. . . . They so raise their own opinion to the skies that they judge 
God with no m ore trouble or fear than  a poor cobbler judges his 
lea ther” (LW25 167).
G od’s free self-disclosure is locked into the straitjacket of “hum an 
metaphysical rules” (LW29 111). The partisans of the “theology of 
glory,” L uther tells us, “want to be like God, and they want their 
thoughts to be no t beneath  God bu t beside H im ” (LW25 366).
The central concept tha t L uther uses to underm ine the “theology of 
glory” is that of the “h idden  God” (deus absconditus) . By “hiddenness,” 
L uther clearly does no t m ean “nonexistence.” He tells us what he 
m eans quite clearly in the lectures on Romans: “ [The work of God] is 
never h idden  in any o ther way than  u n d er tha t which appears contrary 
to our conceptions and ideas” (LW25 366). The “h idden  God” is con­
trasted with the “naked” God longed for by theologians of glory, that 
is, God as an object o f im m ediate apprehension . For Luther, the “h id­
den God” reveals himself, paradoxically, in the suffering hum anity of 
C hrist.13
This paradoxical “revelation in h iddenness” does no t call fo r self­
satisfied certainty or for boasting in the powers of reason, bu t ra ther 
for self-sacrificing trust (Jiducid). The “kingdom  of Christ,” L uther tells 
us, is “a place of exile, or to be living b u t to be constantly dying, or to 
be in glory b u t to be in disgrace, or to dwell in wealth bu t to dwell in 
extrem e poverty, as everyone who wants to share in this kingdom  is 
com pelled to experience in h im self” (LW29 117).
This experience of “riches in poverty” is, of course, faith. Faith, Lu­
th er writes, is like a state of being suspended between “heaven and
12 In  his lec tu res o n  R om ans in  1515-16, L u th e r asserts th a t the  “n a tu ra l know ledge” o f 
G od th ro u g h  theo re tica l reason  serves only to increase h u m a n  p rid e  and  sell-satisfaction 
(LW25 10). In  the  “theology o f  glory,” G od is “ch an g ed  an d  ad ju s ted ” to fit h u m a n  “desires 
an d  n e e d s” (LW25 157).
13 In  o rd e r  to rem ove the p rim ary  cause o f  a lien a tio n  betw een  h um an ity  an d  G od, th a t is, 
h u m a n  p rid e , G od reveals h im self in “his h u m a n  n a tu re , weakness, foolishness” (LW31 52). 
G od m u st be  seen  in the “hum ility  an d  sham e o f the  cross” (LW31 5 2 -5 3 ). The G od “h id d e n ” 
in the hum an ity  o f  C hrist is elsew here called “the  G od who is n o t  seen ” (LW29 111).
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earth ,” of lacking any foothold  (LW29 185). O ne who believes dwells 
in “the deepest darkness of God” (LW29 216). L uther tries to express 
faith thusly: “And this is the glory of faith, namely, no t to know where 
you are going, what you are doing, what you are suffering, and, after 
taking everything captive—perception and  understanding , strength 
and will—to follow the bare voice of God and  to be led and driven 
ra ther than to drive” (LW29 238).
Faith in the “hidden  God” requires that one bear the “cross” of being 
a finite, historical being, a being that is incapable of ever “having” God 
except by continuously seeking after him. L uther stresses that “the con­
dition of this life is not that of having but of seeking God” (LW25 
225).14
Alongside the faith that God is indeed  at work in the dereliction of 
the cross goes hope. A nother favorite passage of L u th er’s was Rom. 8: 
24, “Now hope that is seen is no t hope.” H ope, according to Luther, 
“transfers [one] into the unknown, the h idden, and the dark shadows, 
so that [one] does not even know what [one] hopes for, and  yet [one] 
knows what [one] does no t hope fo r” (LW25 364). In faith and  hope 
God is “h id d en ” or “absent,” in the sense of being inaccessible to im­
m ediate apprehension. At the same time, God is also mysteriously pres­
en t in a way that solicits hum an trust and  gratitude ra th e r than pride 
and presum ption.
During the early 1920s, H eidegger’s philosophical theology begins 
to take on a notably L utheran  cast. While H eidegger never simply signs 
on to L utheran theology, his basic position clearly shows the influence 
of Luther. That this is the case can be seen in four points that capture 
H eidegger’s inchoate philosophical theology during  this period, and,
O O  1 1 O /  O  1 ’  ’
indeed, th roughou t the rem ainder of his career: First, the most obvi­
ously L utheran  elem ent of H eidegger’s theology is his critique of on- 
totheology, that is, of the trad ition  of philosophical m onotheism  that 
L uther had called the “theology of glory.” Second, and  closely related  
to this, is H eidegger’s willingness to em brace the label of “atheism ” in 
o rder to avoid falling in to  the conceptual traps of philosophical m on­
otheism . T hird, H eidegger m aintained that a critical perspective on 
ontotheology could be sustained and enriched  by exam ining the phe­
nom ena of religious life. Finally, H eidegger also sought to articulate 
the presence of God in factical, historical life as a way of developing a 
conception of God freed  from the assum ptions of traditional on to­
theology.
14 C om pare  L u th e r’s sim ilar co m m en t elsew here: “For this reason  th e  w hole life o f  the  new 
p eop le , th e  faith fu l peop le , th e  sp iritual p eop le , is n o th in g  else b u t prayer, seeking, an d  
begging  by th e  sighing o f th e  h e a r t . . . , never s tand ing  still, never possessing” (LW25 264).
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All o f these elem ents show up in num erous places in H eidegger’s 
work. The first, and most obvious, place to look is in H eidegger’s well- 
known WS 1920-21 lecture course on Pauline Christianity. H eidegger 
first of all picks up on L u th er’s critique of the way in which ontotheol- 
ogy actually distorts the message of Christianity, which he views as be­
ing roo ted  in the “proclam ation” of Jesus as Christ (G60 116 /82 ) .Io 
Following L u th er’s em phasis on revelation, H eidegger m aintains that 
being a Christian is, fundam entally, a gift, ra th e r than  an intellectual 
achievem ent. H eidegger denounces the attem pt to “gain a hold [Halt]” 
in life th rough  a personally willed act of “transcendence” (G60 122/ 
86). H eidegger radicalizes L u ther’s thought, arguing that “the Chris­
tian does not find his ‘ho ld ’ in God (cf. Jaspers). T hat is a blasphemy! 
God is never a ‘ho ld !’” (G60 122/86).
In this same lecture course, H eidegger is in terested  in them atizing 
the actual relation to God that is articulated in Paul’s earliest letter. 
The life of the early C hristian com m unity has been subjected to an 
“absolute reversal [Umwendung],” a “tu rn ing  toward God and away from 
idols” (G60 9 5 /66 ). T hat is, the relation between the believer and  God 
has the character of a total way of life, as opposed to the strictly the­
oretical in tentional stance of a classic philosophical theologian. “The 
absolute turn  towards God is explicated within the enactm ent sense of 
life in two directions: douleuein and anamnein, living before God [Wan- 
deln vor Gott] and waiting in endurance [Erharren]” (G60 95 /66).
Despite the fact that no one ever has a “ho ld” on God, H eidegger is 
quick to po in t out that there is nonetheless a “living, effective connec­
tion with G od.” “G od’s presence has a basic relation to the way of life 
[Lebenswandel} (peripatein). The reception is itself a living before God” 
(G60 9 5 /66 ). W hile no t simply “available” to hum an beings like a tool 
o r a piece of leather, God is nevertheless present in an elusive way 
within factical, historical life itself. H ere again, L u th er’s work has a 
clear relevance. L u th er’s “theology of the cross” locates the definitive 
revelation of the nature of God within history, within the life of a par­
ticular individual, and, by extension, also in the ongoing life of faith. 
W hat was decisive for H eidegger was the elusive presence o f God in 
the midst of a life of “anxious worrv” ra th e r than  in the ahistorical
j
conceptual space of philosophical m onotheism . H eidegger explores 
this elusive presence particularly in connection with early Christian 
eschatology, where an attitude of wakeful expectation replaces that of
1 ’ Elsew here, H eid eg g er accen ts th e  d istu rb ing , d isqu ie ting  aspect o f  th e  “p ro c lam a tio n ” 
o f  th e  “crucified  G od” (G60 136-37/96--97, 143--44/101--2).
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self-satisfied contem plation (G60 97 -100 /66 -70 , 102-105/71-73 , 112/ 
79).
Many of the m ain elem ents of H eidegger’s Luther-inspired philo­
sophical theology reappear the following sem ester in his “Augustine 
and  N eoplatonism ” lecture course.16 The critique of ontotheology 
em erges here in connection with A ugustine’s use of the N eoplatonic 
concept of the “highest good.” In denying this version of philosophical 
m onotheism , H eidegger is by no means denying that hum an beings 
can actually have a relationship with God. To the contrary, it is in the 
nam e of an au thentic relationship to God tha t he undertakes this cri­
tique, castigating philosophical m onotheism  as m ere “doing business 
[Geschaftigkeit] with God" (G60 2 6 5 /1 9 8 ).1'
M aterials that have been collected from  Oskar Becker’s transcrip t of 
this lecture course continue in m uch the same vein. C om m enting on 
some of A ugustine’s serm ons, H eidegger argues tha t the “objectivity” 
( Gegenstandlichkeit) p ro p e r to God can be adequately grasped only by 
paying atten tion  to the nature of God “as appropriated  [zueignet] by 
the heart in its au thentic life” (G60 289/219). By locating the encoun­
ter with God in the “h eart” ra th e r than  in abstract theorizing, H eideg­
ger is n o t advocating subjectivism. God is n o t “m ade” by hum an cog­
nitive faculties. Rather, God is mysteriously p resen t in the elusive 
depths of factical, historical life. “God as object in the sense of the 
fades cordis [face of the heart] exists [wirkt] in the au thentic life of 
hum an beings” (G60 2 8 9 /2 1 9 ).18
Three years later, in the sum m er of 1924, H eidegger had the occasion 
to deal with Luther in the classroom once more. Here again, he focuses 
in on L u ther’s polemic against the “theology of glory,” which defines
16 This lec tu re  course  also con ta in s a  b rie f  discussion o f  L u th e r’s “H eid e lb erg  D ispu ta tion” 
o f  1518, o n e  o f  the  m ost im p o rta n t a rticu la tions o f  his “theology o f  the  cross.” See G60 
2 8 1 -8 2 /2 1 2 -1 3 . H e id eg g e r’s gloss o n  Thesis 19 reads like a  fo rm ula ic  encapsu la tion  o f  his 
ow n p h ilo soph ical theology: “ The p resen ta tio n  [Vorgabe] o f  the  o b jec t o f  theology is n o t  to 
be  achieved by way o f  a  m etaphysical reflec tio n  o n  the  w orld” (G60 2 8 2 /2 1 3 ).
17 O n  H e id eg g e r’s read ing , such  an  “axiologized ab strac tio n ” conceals the  actual experien ce  
o f  G od in “existentie ll anx ious w orry” (G60 2 5 9 /1 9 5 ). In  h is 1947 “L ette r o n  H um an ism ,” 
H eid eg g er on ce  again  expresses h is w orries a b o u t concep tualiz ing  G od in  the  categories o f  
value theory. In  this case, h e  is m o re  im m ediately  c o n ce rn ed  w ith neo-K antianism  th an  with 
N eoplaton ism . H e argues th a t “precisely th ro u g h  the characteriza tion  o f  so m e th in g  as ‘a 
va lue’ w hat is so valued is ro b b ed  o f  w orth . . . . Every valuing, even w here it values positively, 
is a  subjectivizing” (G9 3 4 9 /2 6 5 ). Thus, “W hen  o n e  p roclaim s ‘G o d ’ the  a lto g e th e r  ‘h ighest 
va lue ,’ this is a  d eg rad a tio n  o f  G o d ’s essence” (G9 3 4 9 /2 6 5 ).
18 This p o in t is m ade m o re  explicitly a  b it  la te r o n  in H eid eg g e r’s discussion: “Every cosmic- 
m etaphysical re ification  [ Verdinglichung] o f  the  c o n c e p t o f  G od, even as an  irra tio n a l concep t, 
m ust be  avoided. O n e  m u st ap p ro p ria te  the fades cordis (inw ardness) by oneself. G od will be 
p re sen t in the  in n e r  m an  w hen we have u n d ersto o d  w hat b re a d th , leng th , h e ig h t, an d  d e p th  
( latitude, longitude, altitude, profundum ) m ean , an d  thus u n d e rstan d  the m ean in g  o f  the  infinity 
o f  G od fo r the  th o u g h t o f  the  h e a r t” (G60 290).
192
On the Track of the Fugitive Gods
the being of God in advance of his own free self-disclosure, by means of 
borrowed categories like “first cause” or “unm oved mover” (S 107). Hei­
degger accurately summarizes the thrust of L u ther’s position: “The Scho­
lastic takes cognizance of Christ only subsequently, after having defined 
the being of God and the world. This Greek point of view of the Scho­
lastic makes man proud; he must first go to the cross before he can say 
id quod res est [what the m atter actually is]” (S 107).
H eidegger seems to agree with L uther that it is only in a contingent, 
finite, historical event of self-disclosure th a t one can catch a glimpse 
of the nature of God. T hroughout the 1920s, H eidegger consistently 
argues tha t the categories of philosophical m onotheism  are simply not 
up to the task of m aking sense of this fundam ental reality of Christian 
life and  th o u g h t.19 H eidegger was, as I have shown in the preceding  
discussion, in terested  no t onlv in the historical facticitv of the cross as 7 j  j  
the revelation of God bu t also in the mysterious presence of God in 
the “cruciform ” life of individual believers and of the primitive church. 
The heart of H eidegger’s philosophical theology during  this period  is 
the L utheran  concept of the “h idden  God,” the God no t available for 
the purposes of theoretical reason but nonetheless palpably p resen t in 
“factical life-experience.” T hat such a God has eluded “m etaphysics” 
should come as no surprise to anyone fam iliar with H eidegger’s overall 
conviction th a t traditional philosophy has failed to adequately them a- 
tize or conceptualize hum an factical life itself.20
A nother significant elem ent of H eidegger’s philosophical theology 
is also explicable in light of the influence of L uther on his thinking 
during  the early 1920s. During WS 1921-22, while he was engaged in 
intensive study of L u th er’s works, H eidegger makes reference to the 
“atheism ” of philosophy.21 R ather than com m itting philosophers to 
some form of positive atheism , H eidegger is instead drawing the logical 
conclusions from  his reading of L uther.22 Philosophy must, according
19 In  his p rog ram m atic  essay, “P henom en o lo g y  a n d  T heology,” H eid eg g er argues th a t the  
revelation  o f  th e  “crucified  G od” constitu tes th e  u ltim ate g ro u n d  fo r g en u in e  “C hristianness,” 
a n d  so fo r any theology th a t can  righdy  claim  to be  “C hristian” (G9 5 2 -5 4 /4 4 —45). T his is, 
o f  course, a  m anifesdy L u th e ra n  position .
20 H e id eg g e r’s critique  o f  the  lim ita tions o f  th e  “theo re tica l a ttitu d e ” beg ins in  the  W ar 
E m ergency S em este r o f  1919. See 0 5 6 /5 7  7 3 -7 4 /6 1 , 8 5 /7 1 -7 2 , 8 8 /7 4 , 9 1 /7 6 .
21 F or a  co g en t analysis o f  this n o tio n  o f  the  “a theism ” o f  philosophy, see Istvan M. Feher, 
“H eid eg g e r’s U n d erstan d in g  o f  th e  ‘A theism ’ o f  Philosophy: Philosophy, Theology, a n d  Re­
lig ion  in  Ilis  Early L ectu res up to Being and Time,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 
(1995): 189-228.
22 T h e  term  “positive atheism ,” th a t is, th e  d ire c t d en ia l o f  the  existence o f  G od, is borrow ed  
from  A nthony  Flew’s classic essay, “T h e  P resu m p tio n  o f  A theism ,” in  Contemporary Perspectives 
on Religious Episletnohgy, ed . R. D ouglas G eivett a n d  B ren d an  Sw eetm an (O xford : O xford  
University Press, 1992)” 19-32.
193
to Heidegger, renounce any and all attem pts “to have and to determ ine 
G od” (G61 197/148). T he difficult bit, the “a rt” of it, is both to “do 
philosophy” and to “be genuinely religious” (G61 197/148). In Hei­
degger’s view, being “genuinely religious” has little to do with prattle 
about God and  has noth ing  at all to do with successfully undertak ing  
the project o f ontotheology. Thus, philosophy is best characterized as 
being “away from ” or “far from ” (weg) God. This distance is m ore of 
the respectful variety, which, of course, can often be m istaken for 
standoffishness. Lest confusion befall his listeners, H eidegger makes it 
clear that in “carrying o u t” this distance, philosophy always has its own 
“difficult ‘near to ’ or ‘next to ’ [bei]” God (G61 197/148). H eidegger 
reiterates these ideas half a decade later, in his sum m er sem ester (SS) 
1928 lecture course. He is quite willing to endure the charge of being 
“godless” in o rder to avoid “enorm ously phony religiosity,” which is 
presum ably the opposite of being “genuinely religious” (see above; G26 
211/165, n. 9). In his usual way, H eidegger goes on to make an even 
m ore suggestive com m ent, without, however, developing the sugges­
tion: “But m ight no t the presum ably ontic faith in God be at bottom  
godlessness? And m ight the genuine metaphysician be m ore religious 
than  the usual faithful, than the m em bers of a ‘ch u rch ’ or even than 
the ‘theologians’ of every confession?” (G26 211/165, n. 9).
H eidegger here radicalizes the spirit (if no t the letter) of L u th er’s 
theological revolution. For Luther, bad theology is, in a certain sense, 
worse than  no theology at all. Bad theology blocks the appropriation  
of the saving power o f the Gospel by veiling it u n d er borrow ed con­
cepts. For Heidegger, too, uphold ing  a particular dogm atic system is 
n o t necessarily the same th ing as godliness. In fact, H eidegger wants 
to call into question the “Christianness” (Christlichkeit) o f both  m uch 
of the theological tradition  and of m odern  liberal Protestantism . Like 
Luther, H eidegger is convinced th a t m uch o f theology is com plicit in 
an attem pt to subvert the h eart of Christianity and its startling message 
of the “crucified God.”
These, then , are the contours of H eidegger’s philosophical theology 
as it develops during  the 1920s. First, following Luther, H eidegger re­
jects the trad ition  of philosophical m onotheism  tout court. At the same 
time, he attem pts to avoid tossing out the real core of Christian faith 
and life and stops well short of positive atheism. He undertakes several 
halting and abortive attem pts at a phenom enology of religious life as 
a m eans for developing a counterw eight to ontotheology. In connec­
tion with this phenom enological move, H eidegger also expresses his 
in terest in them atizing the elusive presence of God in the “h ea rt,” in 
“anxious worry,” ra ther than  in the cool room  of theoretical reason.
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Finally, H eidegger is willing to be dismissed as an atheist and  an apos­
tate in o rder to avoid transgressing the boundaries set by his own cri­
tique of the tradition.
in. h o l d e r l i n :  o n  t h e  t r a c k  o f  t h e  f u g i t i v e  g o d s
Beginning in the mid-1930s, H eidegger began to work out some of 
these hints o f a philosophical theology in the m idst o f his larger con­
versation with H olderlin. H eidegger’s in terest in H olderlin, and  in 
o ther Gcrman-languagc poets, had started  m uch earlier, during  his 
days as a university studen t.23 Following World War I, H eidegger en­
listed the poets as allies in his attem pt to grasp the pretheoretical im­
mediacy of “factical life-experience” and  to break the hegem ony of the 
“theoretical a ttitu d e” that had characterized European philosophy 
since its inception in ancien t G reece.24
As several com m entators have noted, H eidegger was also in terested  
in the theological potential of poets like H olderlin  and  Rilke. Poggeler, 
for example, makes constant reference to H eidegger’s am biguous 
stance vis-a-vis theology in his own exposition of the dialogue between 
H eidegger and  H olderlin .20 Figal has rightly characterized H olderlin  
as H eidegger’s “poet of the fled gods.”26 H eidegger him self tries to 
make this connection as explicit as possible at a num ber o f points. In 
his 1970 preface to the program m atic essay “Phenom enology and  T he­
ology,” H eidegger groups Nietzsche, H olderlin , and  Franz Overbeck 
together a round  the whole problem atic of theology, of the “Christian- 
ness of Christianity and  its theology” (G9 4 5 -4 6 /3 9 ). In the appendix  
to this essay, a le tter written in 1964 to a group of theologians at Drew 
University, H eidegger suggests that poetry is a potentially powerful re­
source for the theological pro ject of articulating Christian faith w ithout 
im porting foreign categories (G9 78 /61 ). Referring to the 1946 essay 
“Wozu Dichter?” H eidegger suggests tha t poetry is capable o f express­
ing the elusive, nonobjective, nonem pirical presence o f God in faith. 
In this section, I want to follow up on H eidegger’s hints and  sugges­
tions abou t the theological aspect of his dialogue with poets, focusing 
particularly on H olderlin. T here are two reasons for this narrow ing of 
scope, one having to do with H eidegger and  the o ther with H olderlin.
23 See Poggeler, “H eideggers B egegnung  m it H o ld e rlin ,” 15.
24 H e quotes from  I lo ld e r l in ’s free  transla tion  o f  S ophocles’ Antigone as an  illustra tion  of 
the  p re th eo re tica l “en v iro n m en ta l e x p e rien ce” o f  m ean in g  (G 5 6 /5 7  7 4 /6 2 ) . A n u m b e r  o f 
years later, follow ing the  p u b lica tion  o f Being and Time, H e id eg g er refers to R ilke’s Notebooks 
o f Malle Laurids Brigge to m u ch  th e  sam e effect (G24 2 4 4 /1 7 1 -7 2 ).
2> Poggeler, “H eideggers B egegnung  m it H o ld erlin , 20-21, 24, 26, 38-39.
26 See Figal, “Forgetfu lness o f G od ,” 202.
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First, as is quite obvious, H olderlin  was the poet who most often en­
gaged H eidegger’s reflections. In num erous essays and  lecture courses 
H eidegger explicitly deals with aspects of H o lderlin ’s work.
Second, H o lderlin ’s poetry has an obvious religious pathos to it, a 
pathos similar in many ways to that which anim ates H eidegger’s own 
work. W hile H olderlin  clearly was willing to transgress the boundaries 
of orthodoxy in his poetry, he m aintained a profound  reverence for 
the Christian tradition. This is most evident in his later hymns. For 
exam ple, in “Der Einzige,” the poet enacts a passionate search for 
Christ: “Ihr alten C otte r u nd  all /  Ih r tapfern Sohne der C otter /  Noch 
Einen such ich, den /  Ich liebe u n te r euch /  Wo ih r den lezten cures 
Geschlechts /  Des HauBes Kleinod m ir /  dem frem den Caste verber- 
get.”2/ A similar sentim ent is evoked in the fragm entary hymn “An die 
M adonna.” In “Patm os,” H olderlin  evokes the visionary experience of 
St. John . Thus, despite the fact that he was willing to sit loose with 
respect to orthodoxy, H olderlin  nevertheless expresses a profoundly 
religious sensibility. Heidegger, no doubt, saw his own m ixture of pas­
sion and dis-ease with religion reflected in the works of his predecessor.
The sheer volume of the fruits of H eidegger’s lifelong interpretive 
encounter with H olderlin  prevents me from attem pting  an exam ina­
tion o f all of the many lecture courses, essays, and working drafts ger­
m ane to the subject. Thus, I will focus on three o f the most im portan t 
of H eidegger’s writings on H olderlin: (1) the WS 1934-35 lecture 
course on H o lderlin ’s hymn “G erm anien,” (2) the centennial essay on 
the elegy “H eim kunft,” delivered in 1943, and  (3) the postwar essay 
“Wozu Dichter?” (1946).
The theological problem atic appears at the outset o f H eidegger’s 
reading o f “G erm anien,” focused on the very first lines o f the poem : 
“N icht sie, die Seeligen, die erschienen sind, /  Die G otterbilder in dem 
alten Lande, /  Sie d a rf ich ja  n icht rufen m ehr.”28 H eidegger zeroes 
in on the first word o f the poem , “N icht” (not). Despite appearances 
to the contrary, H eidegger wants to suggest, this word does not signify 
a straightforw ard negation or “refusal” (Absage; G39 81). Instead, in 
the context of these lines, “N icht” expresses the situation o f “having 
to give up a claim to som ething.” Thus, ra th e r than denying the exis­
tence of “the blessed,” the poet is trying to articulate their distance
2/ H o ld erlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 219-20. In translation : “You a n c ien t gods an d  all 
/  You valiant sons o f  th e  gods, /  O n e  o th e r  I look  fo r  whom  /  W ithin your ranks I love, /  
W here h id d en  fro m  th e  alien guest, fro m  m e, /  You keep  th e  last o f  your k ind , /  T h e  treasu red  
gem  o f th e  h ouse .”
28 Ibid., 188. In translation : “N o t th em , th e  blessed, w ho once  ap p ea red , /  T hose  im ages 
o f  gods in th e  a n c ien t lan d , /  I m ay in d eed  n o  lo n g e r  invoke th em ” (translation  m od ified ).
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from his presen t situation. A ccording to Heidegger, the poet is “await­
ing” (erharren) them  as present, yet still distant. H eidegger’s choice of 
the word “erharren” is significant here. In his WS 1920-21 lecture 
course on Pauline Christianity, he had used precisely this rare term  to 
characterize the expectant attitude of the prim itive church, longing 
for the “day of the L ord” in the m idst of the “night of the w orld.” The 
word that H olderlin  uses to characterize his attitude is “Heiliglrauernde” 
(holy m ourning).
H eidegger’s exposition of the poem  is now focused on the phenom ­
enology of this “holy m ourn ing” for the “gods who are fled” (Entjlohene 
Gotter). First, he argues that this attitude is “holy” because it is “unsel­
fish” (uneigenniitzig; G39 84). The poet refuses to subm it the absent 
gods to the dem ands of utility or productivity. R ather than  simply de­
nying the gods or acquisitively lusting for their presence, the poet is 
willing to endure their absence in longing expectation. In this respect, 
H eidegger argues that “holy m ourn ing” is like love. He reads “love” 
after the fashion of Augustine, defining it as “wanting the beloved to 
stand firm in its essence, in its being  thus and so” (G39 82). During 
SS 1921, the record  indicates that H eidegger lingered over A ugustine’s 
a ttem pt to articulate au thentic love, which he contrasts with the love 
of the “gourm and” (Sch.lem.mer) for the “fieldfare,” which the gourm and 
loves and then  uses up. Real love is a “will to the being of the beloved” 
(G60 292/220). “G enuine love o f G od,” moreover, “has the sense of 
wanting to make God accessible as one who exists in an absolute sense. 
This is the greatest difficulty of life” (G60 292/221).
Similarly, in H o lderlin ’s hymn, the p o e t’s m ournful “renuncia tion” 
( Verzicht) of the righ t to invoke the gods is an attem pt to preserve their 
being, their divinity (G39 93). H eidegger summarizes: “Holy m ourning 
has resolved upon a renunciation  [Verzicht] of the old gods—but—what 
the m ourning heart wants is som ething different— i.e., in sending the 
gods away, to preserve their divinity inviolate, and in a preserving re­
nunciation  to hold to the distant gods in the nearness of their divinity. 
. . . W hat is this besides— indeed, it is no th ing  besides— the only pos­
sible, decisive prepara tion  for waiting upon [Erharren] the gods” (G39 
95).
Thus, the p o e t’s attitude is indeed  one o f “m ourning ,” for he is not 
renouncing  the gods or denying their existence. Indeed , H eidegger is 
careful to explicitly contrast “holy m ourn ing” with straightforw ard 
atheism  (G39 95). The gods are, to be sure, no t simply available. But, 
given what we know about H eidegger’s views on God, there is no rea­
son to think that there ever was a time when the divine was simply 
there for us, like a piece of shoe leather. Instead, the p o e t’s attitude,
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like the eschatological “anxious worry” of the primitive church and  the 
trusting self-renunciation of L u th er’s “theology of the cross” is the only 
one befitting the dignity of the object.
A bit later on in the lecture on “G erm anien,” H eidegger takes an 
opportunity  to develop one of the central them es of his philosophical 
theology, th a t is, the critique o f ontotheology or philosophical m ono­
theism. This time, he takes his cue from the ode “D ichterberuf.” The 
concluding lines of the poem  appear, in m uch the same fashion as the 
opening lines of “G erm anien,” to entail some kind o f straightforw ard, 
positive atheism: “bis Gottes Fehl hilft.”29 Talking about God being 
“missing” or “absent” seems one step away from talking, with Nietzsche, 
about God being “dead .”30 Indeed, as H eidegger points out, this is ju st 
how the famous H olderlin  scholar von H ellingrath had  read  the word 
“Fehl' (missing). O n this view, “Fehl’ is a synonym for “Abivesenheit,” or 
“absence” in the sense of being nonexistent (G39 211). H eidegger 
wants to reject this straightforw ard reading, arguing that som ething 
m uch m ore subtle is going on than  an expression of a p o e t’s despair 
at the loss of faith.
H eidegger’s argum ent turns, first of all, on contextualizing these 
lines within the ode as a whole. Two earlier lines are crucial in this 
regard. The first runs, “Noch ists auch gut zu weise zu seyn.”31 This 
line continues, “Ihn kenn t /  Der Dank.” The p ro n o u n  in this line 
refers back, on the m ost obvious reading, to the masculine noun at 
the beginning of the previous stanza, “Der Vater,” clearly a poetic ap­
pellation for God. In cautioning against being “all too wise” and sug­
gesting that “thanks” ra th e r than  hum an cunning is the only viable 
attitude toward “Der Vater,” H olderlin  is chastening the titanic aspi­
rations of humanity.
This is also the clear sense of the o ther lines tha t H eidegger refers 
to in his in terpre tation : “Zu lang ist alles Gottliche dienstbar schon /  
Und alle Him m elskrafte verschertzt, verbraucht /  Die G utigen, zur 
Lust, danklos, ein /  Schlaues G eschlecht u n d  zu kennen  wahnt es.32 
Note the contrast th a t H olderlin  has drawn between those who are 
“danklos” and  the “D ank” tha t alone is a suitable m eans of access to 
the divine Father. The whole th rust of the poem  is captured  in the
29 Ibid., 83. In  translation: “until G o d ’s b e in g  m issing helps .”
30 F or H eid eg g e r’s ow n take o n  this fam ous tro p e  o f  N ietzsche’s, see his 1943 essay “Nietz­
sche’s W ord: ‘G od is D ead ”' (G5 157-99).
31 H o ld erlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 80. In  translation: “N or is it good to be all too 
wise.”
32 Ibid., 80. In  translation : “Too lo n g  now  th ings divine have b e e n  cheaply  used /  A nd all 
the  pow ers o f  heaven, the  kindly, sp e n t /  In  trifling  waste by cold and  c u n n in g  /  M en w ithou t 
thanks.”
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lines “N icht liebt er Wildes! Doch es zwinget /  N im m er die weite Ge- 
walt den H im m el.”33 Thus, on H eidegger’s view, the concluding phrase 
“Gottes Fehl” can be properly understood  only within the context of 
the p o e t’s critique of a kind of knowledge “roo ted  in cunning and 
selfish calculation,” a knowledge that is “merely clever” and  “only finds 
som ething if it has a use for it and  if it prom otes its own power” (G39 
229). H olderlin  draws a p ro p er contrast between titanic knowledge and 
the attitude of the poet, “a lone” and  without artifice before God, p ro ­
tected only by his “innocence” (G39 232).
A ccording to Heidegger, “W hat is to be accented is no t G od’s being 
missing [Fehl], bu t God’s being missing” (G39 232). T hat is, the point 
of the poem is no t to assert G od’s nonexistence, bu t ra ther to defend 
his unavailability to hum an “cunning and  selfish calculation.” The con­
cept of G od’s “being missing,” like L u th er’s concept of the “hidden 
God” (deus absconditus), is m eant to play a role in a critique of philo­
sophical m onotheism . As H eidegger him self shows in his 1924 lecture 
on Luther, the whole problem  with the scholastic “theology of glory” 
is that it defines God in advance in term s of borrow ed metaphysical 
categories. In so doing, it forecloses on the possibility of really being 
faced with the “scandal” of G od’s free self-disclosure in a finite histor­
ical reality.
In H eidegger’s philosophical theology, then , God is “missing” or 
“h id d en ” insofar as he ultim ately transcends the categories of the dom ­
inant tradition  of W estern metaphysics. At the same time, God is no t 
totally inaccessible, bu t is p resen t in a mysterious way in factical, his­
torical reality. As I have already discussed, this elem ent of H eidegger’s 
philosophical theology first comes on the scene in his working notes 
for the undelivered lecture course on medieval mysticism, and  it also 
shows up in his WS 1920-21 lectures on Pauline Christianity and  his 
SS 1921 lectures on Augustine. In the “G erm anien” lectures from WS 
1934-35, H eidegger finds a new vocabulary for articulating this idea. 
H ere, he draws on the hymn “Wie wenn am Feiertage” and the ode 
“Rousseau.” In the former, H olderlin  describes m ediated presence of 
the divine in the creative fires of poetic inspiration.34 He uses the im­
agery of lightning, of the “heilgem  Stral,” “him mlisches Feuer,” “Des 
Vaters Stral,” which the poet m ediates to the people.30
Ibid., 80. In  transla tion : “I le  loves n o  T itan! N ever will o u r  /  F ree-rang ing  pow er coerce 
his h eaven .”
■’'1 See th e  discussion o f  this hym n in R ichard  U nger, Holderlins Major Poetry: The Dialectics 
o f Unity (B loom ington : In d ian a  University Press, 1975), 107-22.
3 > I lo ld erlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 174, 176. In  translation : “holy ray,” “heavenly fire ,” 
“th e  F a th e r’s ray.”
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In “Rousseau,” H olderlin  praises the p rophetic  type who heralds the 
arrival of the “R om m endcn G ottern .”36 In his lecture, H eidegger draws 
out the eighth stanza of the ode: “V ernom m en hast du sie, verstanden 
die Sprache der Frem dlinge, /  G edeutet ihre Seele! Dem Sehnenden 
war /  Der W ink genug, u nd  Winke sind /  Von Alters her die Sprache 
der G otte.”3' H eidegger takes these materials from  “Wic wenn am 
Feiertage” and “Rousseau” together as outlines of the poetic vocation, 
here conceived in explicitly religious terms. The poet is one who is 
sensitive to the elusive “language” of God, which consists in nothing 
m ore than  “hin ts” ( Winke) and lightning flashes o f m om entary insight 
(G39 32). H eidegger goes on to probe m ore deeply into the m eaning 
of “ Winke” as the “language” of God. O n his reading, the key to u n ­
derstanding what H olderlin  is saying lies in seeing the link between 
the nom inal “Winke” and the verb “winken,” m eaning “to gesture, 
beckon.” The m eaning of the latter is best grasped in the context of 
departu re and arrival. In “taking leave” (Abschied) of som eone, to “win­
ken” is to “hold  fast to nearness in the growing distance.” As one moves 
away, a gesture o f the hand  marks o n e ’s presence, even as one is no 
longer directly available. So similarly, in “arriving” (A nkun ft), to gesture 
in this way is to anticipate a “gladdening nearness” despite the fact that 
distance still rem ains between two parties (G39 32).
As Poggclcr points out, this whole discussion represents an attem pt 
to conceive of the divine as in process, as a dynamic event o f revelation 
in hiddenness.38 To speak in this way about G od’s “hin ts” is to speak 
about his elusive presence within historical reality. Thus, despite the 
fact tha t God is “missing” from  the po in t of view of calculative ratio­
nality, God is nonetheless present. This presence, however, cannot be 
p inned  down to any particu lar historical event or theological form ula. 
The divine withdraws from  such attem pts, and yet it leaves behind  
“h in ts” of its presence.39 This em phasis is a staple elem ent of H eideg­
ger’s philosophical theology. As I have already discussed, beginning in 
the years im mediately following World War I, H eidegger attem pted  to 
them atize this elusive “objectivity” (Gegenstdndlichkeit) o f God within 
finite, tem poral, historical reality. H eidegger picks up on the “scandal”
* Ibid., 50. Io translation : “arriv ing  gods.”
31 Ibid. In translation : “You’ve h ea rd  a n d  c o m p re h e n d e d  th e  s tran g e r’s to n g u e , /  In ter­
p re ted  th e ir  soul! For th e  yearn ing  m an /  T h e  h in t sufficed, because in h in ts fro m  /  T im e 
im m em oria l th e  gods have spoken .”
38 See O tto  Poggeler, The Paths o f Heidegger's Life and Thought, trans. Jo h n  Bailiff (A tlantic 
H igh lands, NJ: H um anities, 1997), 223.
39 Similarly, in his WS 1920-21 lec tu re  course, H eid eg g er stresses tha t, desp ite  the  “incal- 
culability” o f  th e  advent o f  th e  “day o f  th e  L o rd ,” a “living effective co n n e c tio n ” n onetheless 
ob ta ins betw een G od an d  th e  com m unity  o f  faith  (G60 9 5 /6 6 ) .
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of the cross, the historical event o f the “proclam ation ,” the expectant 
faith of the community, the inwardness of the mystic, and fad es  cordis 
of A ugustine’s disquieted soul as points at which the elusive “objectiv­
ity” of God can be located. H o lderlin ’s form ulation of the “hin ts” of 
God in the “lightning bolts” of poetic inspiration and historical cata­
clysms provides H eidegger with a new vocabulary for working out these 
ideas. However, as is the case with his philosophical theology as a 
whole, H eidegger him self never gives us m uch m ore than  suggestive 
“h ints” about the direction he is ultim ately working in.
In a 1943 address given on the occasion of the centennial of H ol­
d erlin ’s death, H eidegger revisits the theological dim ensions of the 
p o e t’s work. C om m enting on the elegy “H cim kunft,” H eidegger picks 
up on the p o e t’s experience of the “h ighest” as som ething ultim ately 
inexpressible (G4 2 6 -2 7 /4 5 ). The poet can merely po in t to where God 
dwells, to some fu ture event o f revelatory disclosure: “N en n ’ ich den 
H ohen dabei? Unschickliches lieben ein Gott nicht, /  Ihn  zu fassen, 
ist fast unsere F rcudc zu klein. /  Schweigen musscn wir oft; es fehlen 
heilige N ahm en, /  H erzen schlagen un d  doch bleibet die Rede zu- 
ruk?”40 O nce again, the God is “missing,” and yet sends “greetings” to 
the poet, who m ust pass them  on to the people (G4 2 8 /46 ). H eidegger 
understands the poetic vocation in this way: “Thus, for the p o e t’s care, 
there is one possibility: w ithout fear of appearing godless, he must 
rem ain near to the g od’s absence, and wait long enough in this p re­
pared  nearness to the absence, until ou t of the nearness to the missing 
god there is g ran ted  an originative word to nam e the high o n e” (G4 
2 8 /46 -47).
This passage quite clearly recalls H eidegger’s own sclf-undcrstand- 
ing, articulated during  the 1920s, as som eone engaged in the project 
of philosophical theology. In WS 1921—22, H eidegger suggests that, 
while standing “apart from ” or “away from ” (weg) God, the ph ilosopher 
nonetheless stands “n ea r” (bet) him in a difficult relation. Later, in 
1928, H eidegger too confesses that he is willing to endure the label of 
“atheism ” in o rder to avoid the pitfalls of popu lar religiosity and phil­
osophical m onotheism . This difficult position is necessitated, for Hei­
degger, by a full appreciation  of L u th er’s critique of the “theology of 
glory.” Recall that the “theology of glory” is characterized by the at­
tem pt to dom esticate the free self-disclosure of God in the fold of Ar­
istotelian metaphysics. The “theologian of the cross,” by contrast, is
H old erlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 164. In  translation: “H im , the  m o st H igh, shou ld
I n am e  then? A g o d  does n o t  love w hat’s unseem ly /  O u r  jo y  is too sm all to em brace  an d  
to h o ld  h im . /  S ilence o ften  behooves us: lacking in  holy nam es, /  May hearts  beat h igh , 
w hile th e  lips hesita te , wary o f  speech?” (transla tion  m odified).
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open to the paradoxical revelation of God in historical particularity, a 
revelation th a t can be ne ith er anticipated n o r dem anded. H eidegger’s 
own self-understanding as a “philosophical theologian of the cross” 
clearly finds its coun terpart in the p o e t’s p atien t waiting for “holy 
nam es” in “H eim kunft.”
Many of the theological them es th a t H eidegger picks up  on in his 
earlier readings o f H olderlin  resurface in his 1946 essay “Wozu Dicht- 
er?” T he essay as a whole is largely devoted to Rilke, no t to H olderlin . 
However, the title comes from  H o ld erlin ’s fam ous elegy “B rot und  
W ein.”41 H eidegger points o u t that, as befits the elegeic tone of the 
poem , the question “W hat are poets for?” arises in the m idst of H ol­
d e rlin ’s experience o f “G od’s keeping him self afar, by ‘G od’s absence 
[Fehl]’” (G5 269 /200). H eidegger had trea ted  o f this idea of G od’s 
“absence” in the 1934-35 lecture course. T he phrase itself, it will be 
recalled, comes from  the ode “D ich terberuf,” in which H olderlin  cas­
tigates the abuse o f divine, life-giving forces by hum an beings. In 
“Brot u nd  W ein,” H olderlin  describes how hum an beings squandered  
the gifts of the gods and  how for the “schwaches GefaB” of hum anity 
the “Fulle” o f the divine is often  too m uch to bear.42 H eidegger draws 
a tten tio n  to the fact th a t in bo th  “D ich te rb e ru f’ and  “B rot und  
W ein,” H olderlin  puts fo rth  the claim th a t hum an beings m ust en ­
dure the “holy n ig h t” o f the absence of the divine in gratitude and 
anticipation . The lines from  “D ich te rb e ru f’ ran : “Furchtlos b leib t 
aber, so e r  es muB, d er M ann /  Einsam  vor Gott, es schiitzet die 
E infalt ihn , /  U nd keiner Waffen brauchts u nd  keiner /  Listen, so 
lange, bis Gottes Fehl h ilft.”43
The task of the poet, as H eidegger then  reads H olderlin , is to p re­
11 The re levan t lines run : “Indessen  d iin k e t m ir  oftens /  Besser zu schlafen , wie so o h n e  
G enossen zu seyn, /  So zu h a r re n  und  was zu th u n  indeB und  zu sagen, /  weiB ich  n ic h t 
und  wozu D ich ter in  d iirf tig e r  Zeit” (H o lderlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 156). In  trans­
lation: “B ut m eanw hile  too o ften  I th in k  i t ’s /  B e tte r to sleep th a n  to be  friend less as we are, 
alone, /  .Always waiting, and  w hat to d o  o r  to say in  th e  m ean tim e  /  I d o n ’t know, an d  why 
are  th e re  poets in  lean  years?” ( trans la tion  m od ified ).
12 Ibid., 156. In  translation : “frail vessel” and  “fullness.”
43 Ibid., 82. In  translation : “M an how ever rem ains, as h e  m ust, fearlessly /  a lo n e  before  
G od, in n o cen ce  p ro tec ts  h im  /  and  h e  need s n o  w eapons and  n o  /  ruses fo r  th e  d u ra tio n  
un til G o d ’s absence helps.” This is R ichard U n g er’s translation . See U nger, Friedrich Holderlin, 
64. O n  p. 65, U nger sum m arizes th e  p rin c ip a l th ru s t o f  I lo ld e rlin ’s reflec tions. W hat h e  says 
ab o u t “D ich te rb eru f” is also, as I le id eg g er recognizes, tru e  o f  “B ro t und  W ein”: “ The poets 
m u st now  e n d u re  the  n ig h t o f  divine absence in  in n o cen ce  and  g ra titude ; eventually  the 
divine absence  will ‘h e lp ’ us, paradoxically, by m ak ing  us s tro n g  en o u g h  to w ithstand the 
divine p resen ce , w hich will b e  m an ifest as soon  as o u r  capabilities p erm it. I t is, finally, the 
‘p o e t’s vocation ,’ th en , to e n d u re  d ep rivation  and  to p rocla im  his know ledgeab le g ra titu d e  
toward an  o b scu re  G od un til o th e r  m e n  have also co m e to partic ip a te  in  this a ttitu d e  so th a t 
they, too, m ay eventually  face th e  p resen c e  o f  th e  fully m an ifest ‘A ngel o f  Day,’ A pollo, the 
deity  as revealed in  ligh t.”
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pare for a p ro p e r residence o f God, by enduring  the “holy n igh t” of 
the world, the “abyss” of the concealm ent o f the divine (G5 2 7 1 / 
201-202). In “D ichterberuf” and in “Brot u nd  W ein,” this “holy n igh t” 
of the divine absence is necessitated by the titanic aspirations of hu ­
manity. On the o ther hand, H olderlin  also suggests th a t the frailty of 
hum an natu re  is such tha t it cannot w ithstand the full p resence of the 
divine.44 Q uoting again from  “Brot und  W ein,” H eidegger asserts that 
“the gods who ‘once were h e re ’ ‘re tu rn ’ only ‘at the p ro p e r tim e’— 
namely, when there is a tu rn  am ong m en in the righ t place in the right 
way” (G5 271/201).
In these b rie f and suggestive passages, H eidegger revisits and ex­
pands upon  the them e of divine “absence” that he had explored earlier 
in the 1934-35 lectures. While this “absence” is certainly om inous and 
painful for hum an beings, it is ultim ately fraught with prom ise. On the 
one hand, the divine withholds itself from  the titanic aspirations of 
humanity. As in L u th er’s “theology o f the cross,” God “hides” him self 
in o rder to defeat the p ride and presum ption that are the ultim ate 
source of the alienation between God and humanity. In poem s like 
“D ich terb eru f’ and “Brot u nd  W ein,” H olderlin  also suggests tha t the 
overcom ing o f this alienation requires a shift in the attitudes o f hum an 
beings toward the divine. In the “holy n igh t” o f the divine absence, 
the only way to enjoy an effective connection with God is to adopt 
attitudes o f expectancy, endurance, and gratitude. This is an idea that 
first enters H eidegger’s conceptual vocabulary in WS 1920-21, where 
he them atizes faith, hope, and eschatological anticipation as the basic 
in tentional stances of the primitive church. The claim is tha t the mys­
terious “absence” o f God calls for a special response on the part of 
hum an beings.
H eidegger dwells at length on this claim in “Wozu Dichter?” Follow­
ing a b rief reference to “T itan ien ,” he asserts: “The m ortal who is to 
reach into the abyss ra ther than  or differently from  others experiences 
the marks [Merkmale] that the abyss observes [vermerkt]. These, for the 
poet, are the tracks of the fugitive gods. This track, in H o lderlin ’s 
experience, is what Dionysus, the wine-god, brings down for the God­
less during  the darkness of their w orld’s night. For the god o f the vine 
preserves in it and in its fru it the essential m utuality of earth  and sky 
as the site of the nuptials o f m en and gods” (G5 271/202).
Abiding in the “absence” or “hiddenness” of God, the po et is a tten­
tive to the traces or tracks o f the God. This image of the “tracks” of
44 A  sim ilar idea  em erges in the fragm en tary  hym n “T ita n e n ,” w here H o ld erlin  writes o f 
the  “A b g ru n d ” in w hich new  lig h t eventually dawns.
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God also comcs from  “Brot u nd  W ein”: “Weil er b leibet un d  selbst die 
Spur der en tflohenen  G otter /  G otterlosen hinab u n te r das Finstere 
b ring t.”45 The “bread  and w ine” of the title of the elegy are rem inders 
of “der H im m lischen, die sonst /  Da gewesen und  die kehren in rich- 
tiger Zeit.”46 The notion  of the “tracks” (Spuren) of the absent gods 
calls to m ind H eidegger’s earlier discussion o f the “h in ts” ( Winke) of 
the gods, that is, about the mysterious and elusive presence o f the 
divine within historical reality. H eidegger is in terested  in H olderlin  
here for his vision o f the poetic vocation as attentiveness to this elusive 
presence. This same in terest can be found  in his readings o f mystics 
such as B ernard of Clairvaux and T heresa o f Avila, for whom the soul 
is “som ehow” the “site for God and the divine,” the “habitation o f God' 
(G60 336/254). Similarly, the elusive presence of God can be them a- 
tized in the eschatological anticipation o f the primitive church, in Lu­
th e r’s understand ing  of faith, and in A ugustine’s fa d es  cordis.
W hat is new in “Wozu Dichter?” is the appeal to tangible, physical 
m anifestations of this elusive presence that is held to in m em ory and 
in expectation. This is, of course, a m ajor them e no t only in the Judeo- 
Christian tradition  but also in H olderlin ’s poetry. T he prem ier Chris­
tian exam ple is precisely the “bread and wine” o f the Eucharistic feast. 
In a later version of the hymn “Patm os,” H olderlin  evokes the inau­
guration o f the Eucharist by Christ: “Er sah aber der achtsam e Mann 
/  Das Angesicht des Gottes, /  Damals, da, beim Geheimnisse des Wein- 
stoks sie /  ZusammensaBen, zu der S tunde des Gastmals.”4' As H eideg­
ger points out, H olderlin  links Christ and  Dionysus together in his 
poetry, for exam ple, in “Der Einzige.” The Eucharist is, preem inently, 
an act o f rem em brance and of hope. T he bread and wine po in t beyond 
themselves, like “hin ts” o r “tracks,” to a reality that is no t fully manifest, 
bu t is nonetheless real. On H eidegger’s reading, the jo b  of the poet 
in a “destitute tim e” is to a ttend  to these “h in ts” o r “tracks” and  so to 
keep alive the rem em brance and  expectation o f the divine in the p re­
sent “n igh t” of the world. He writes, “Poets are m ortals who gravely 
sing the wine-god and sense [spuren] the track [Spur] of the fugitive 
gods; they stay on the gods’ track, and so they blaze [spuren] a path 
for their mortal relations, a path towards the turn ing  p o in t” (G5 2 7 2 / 
202).
4l> I lo ld erlin , Selected Poems and Fragments, 158. In translation : “Since it lasts an d  conveys the  
trace  o f  th e  gods now  d e p a rte d  /  Down to  th e  godless below, in to  th e  m idst o f  th e ir  g loom .”
46 Ibid., 158. In translation : “th e  H eavenly w ho on ce  w ere /  H ere  an d  shall com e again, 
com e w hen th e ir  adven t is d u e .”
4/ Ibid., 248. In transla tion : “But th e  atten tive m an saw /  T h e  face o f  G od, /  At th a t tim e, 
w hen over th e  mystery o f th e  vine /  They sat together, at th e  h o u r  o f th e  co m m u n a l m eal.”
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IV. C O N C L U S IO N
My goal in this essay has been to exam ine some of H eidegger’s m ore 
well-known in terpretations of H o lderlin ’s poetry, searching for traces 
of H eidegger’s own philosophical theology in these readings. Begin­
ning in the early 1920s, H eidegger began to develop a distinctive ph il­
osophical theology that he never fully articulated  b u t tha t he revisited 
again and again th roughou t his career. His position was decisively im­
pacted by his reading o f Luther, whose critique of the “theology of 
glory” in the nam e o f the “h idden  G od” defined the direction that 
H eidegger took in his own reflections.
H eidegger had always been  in terested  in the philosophical potential 
o f poets like H olderlin  and Rilke, even from  his s tuden t days. In the 
mid-1930s, he began to read H olderlin  in earnest, a move tha t p ro ­
foundly reflected the character o f H eidegger’s tho u g h t as a whole. 
Among the many them es tha t occupied him th roughou t his engage­
m ent with H o lderlin ’s work were those germ ane to his own inchoate 
philosophical theology: the “absence” of God, the phenom enology of 
religious experience, the elusive presence o f the divine in historical 
life, and the critique of philosophical m onotheism . H eidegger found 
in H olderlin  a new, m ore flexible vocabulary with which to express 
these themes.
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